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Resource	Allocation,	Treatment,	Disclosure,	and	Mitochondrial	Replacement	Techniques:	
Some	Comments	on	de	Melo-Martin	and	Harris.	
Abstract	
Should	we	proceed	with	mitochondrial	replacement	technique	(MRT)	research	and	clinical	
practice?	There	has	been	a	lively	debate	on	the	topic	in	this	journal,	in	which	John	Harris	has	
argued	 in	 favour	 of	 this	 position	 and	 Inmaculada	 de	 Melo-Martin	 against	 it.	 This	 paper	
broadens	the	scope	of	this	debate	by	presenting	a	richer	account	of	the	MRT	phenomenon	
and	 by	 exploring	 some	 areas	 that	 naturally	 follow	 from	 Harris’s	 and	 de	 Melo-Martin’s	
discussion	of	the	topic.	First,	I	present	what	mitochondrial	diseases	and	MRTs	are.	I	expand	
on	 Harris’s	 portrayal	 of	 ‘mitochondrial	 disease’,	 which	 de	 Melo-Martin	 seems	 to	 follow.	
Secondly,	 I	address	how	MRTs	could	prevent	mitochondrial	diseases,	and	 if	 they	would	be	
effective	in	doing	so.	 I	do	this	by	unpacking	the	differences	between	the	types	of	MRTs.	A	
detailed	examination	of	the	differences	between	MRTs	shows	that	the	ethical	panorama	is	
more	complex	than	first	 thought.	Thirdly,	and	finally,	 I	present	and	defend	the	thesis	 that	
parents	have	strong	reasons	 to	disclose	to	 their	children	that	 they	were	MRT-conceived.	 I	
show	how	both	Harris’s	and	de	Melo-Martin’s	discussion	of	the	‘right	to	know	our	genetic	
origins’	can	be	complemented.	
	
Keywords:	mitochondrial	replacement	techniques,	maternal	spindle	transfer,	pronuclear	
transfer,	mitochondrial	replacement	therapy,	mitochondrial	donation.	
	
Introduction	
There	has	been	a	 lively	exchange	 in	this	 journal	between	 Inmaculada	de	Melo-Martin	and	
John	Harris	on	the	ethics	of	Mitochondrial	Replacement	Techniques	(MRTs).	Initially,	Harris	
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advocated,	here	and	elsewhere,	for	MRTs.1	He	tried	to	show	that	the	arguments	against	them	
are	flawed	and	that	MRT	research	and	clinical	practice	should	be	supported	because	MRTs	
diminish	suffering	and	increase	wellbeing.		
In	 response,	 de	Melo-Martin2	 argued	 that	 Harris’s	 arguments	 defending	MRTs	 are	 found	
wanting	and	that	we,	in	fact,	should	oppose	them.	She	contended	three	things:	that	Harris	
only	engaged	with	the	weakest	arguments	that	have	been	advanced	against	MRTs,	that	the	
resources	 that	 are	 used	 for	MRT	 research	 and	 clinical	 practice	 should	 be	 repurposed	 for	
achieving	 worthier	 goals,	 and	 that	 MRTs	 are	 not	 necessary	 for	 women	 that	 have	 a	
mitochondrial	DNA	disease	and	want	to	have	children	genetically	related	to	them,	since	they	
could	have	children	through	other	means	(e.g.	adoption	or	egg	donation).		
Harris	then	replied3	to	de	Melo-Martin	and	defended	his	arguments.	Firstly,	he	argued	that	in	
most	 instances	 both	 of	 them	 maintain	 the	 same	 position	 regarding	 de	 Melo-Martin’s	
objections	against	MRTs,	and	where	they	do	diverge	it	is	de	Melo-Martin	who	is	on	the	wrong	
side	of	the	fence.	Secondly,	Harris	contends	that	de	Melo-Martin’s	main	criticism	is	off-target.	
He	maintains	that	he	was	not	making	any	claim	about	what	priority	we	should	give	to	MRT	
research	 and	 clinical	 practice,	 but	 that	 his	 sole	 aim	 was	 to	 assess	 if	 in	 principle	 MRTs,	
conceived	 solely	 as	 biotechnologies	 and	 abstracted	 from	 our	 social	 reality,	 are	 morally	
objectionable	or	not.		
This	paper	constitutes	a	fourth	act	in	this	interplay	of	opinion.	Here	I	will	broaden	the	scope	
of	 the	 debate	 by	 presenting	 a	 richer	 account	 of	 the	 MRTs	 phenomenon:	 when	 we	
independently	examine	each	of	the	techniques	that	have	jointly	have	been	labelled	as	MRTs	
(i.e.	pronuclear	transfer	(PNT)	and	maternal	spindle	transfer	(MST))	we	realise	that	the	ethical	
panorama	is	far	more	complex	than	it	first	appears.	I	will	also	develop	areas	that	naturally	
follow	from	de	Melo-Martin’s	and	Harris’s	discussion	of	the	topic.	
This	paper	proceeds	as	follows.	 In	the	first	section,	 I	describe	what	mitochondrial	diseases	
and	MRTs	are.	This	is	important	because	in	order	to	explain	the	differences	between	MRTs	I	
need	to	expand	on	Harris’s	portrayal	of	‘mitochondrial	disease’,	which	de	Melo-Martin	seems	
to	follow.	In	the	second	section	I	address	how	MRTs	could	prevent	mitochondrial	diseases	and	
if	they	would	be	effective	in	doing	so.	I	do	this	by	unpacking	the	differences	between	MRTs.	
In	the	final	section	I	present	and	defend	that	parents	have	strong	reasons	to	disclose	to	their	
children	that	they	were	MRT-conceived,	and	show	how	this	relates	to	Harris’s	and	de	Melo-
Martin’s	discussion	of	whether	there	is	such	thing	as	a	‘right	to	know	our	genetic	origins’.	
1.	Mitochondrial	Diseases	and	Mitochondrial	Replacement	Techniques	(MRTs)	
Mitochondria	are	cellular	organelles	that	generate	the	energy	cells	need	to	work	properly.	
They	are	characterised	by	possessing	their	own	DNA	(mitochondrial	DNA	(mtDNA)),	by	only	
being	inherited	via	the	maternal	line4,	and	their	means	of	inheritance	are	non-Mendelian.5		
Whereas	nuclear	DNA	(nDNA)	represents	99.9%	of	total	human	DNA,	mtDNA		only	represents	
0.1%.6		
	
In	 both	 ‘Germline	 Modification	 and	 the	 Burden	 of	 Human	 Existence’	 and	 ‘Germline	
Manipulation	and	Our	Future	Worlds’,	Harris	tells	us	that	“[m]itochondrial	disease	can	be	very	
serious,	causing	conditions	like	Leigh’s	disease,	a	fatal	infant	encephalopathy,	and	others	that	
waste	muscles	 or	 cause	 diabetes	 and	 deafness.”7	 De	Melo-Martin,	 in	 ‘When	 the	Milk	 of	
Human	Kindness	becomes	a	Luxury	(and	Untested)	Good.	A	Reply	to	Harris’	Unconditional	
Embrace	of	Mitochondrial	Replacement	Techniques’,	does	not	provide	a	characterisation	of	
mitochondrial	diseases.		
	
I	will	expand	on	Harris’s	characterisation	of	‘mitochondrial	disease’,	because	for	the	sake	of	
this	discussion	it	is	important	to	be	specific	about	the	details	of	what	mitochondrial	diseases	
are	 and	 how	 MRTs	 could	 prevent	 them.	 In	 a	 broad	 sense,	 there	 are	 two	 classes	 of	
mitochondrial	diseases:	mitochondrial	diseases	that	are	caused	by	problems	in	the	mtDNA,	
and	mitochondrial	 diseases	 that	 are	 caused	 by	 problems	 in	 the	 nDNA.8	 This	 distinction	 is	
important	because	MRTs	cannot	be	employed	to	deal	with	mitochondrial	diseases	caused	by	
problems	in	the	nDNA.	MRTs	can	only	be	employed	when	the	problems	are	caused	by	the	
genes	 in	the	mitochondria	themselves.	 In	other	words,	MRTs	can	only	be	employed	when	
dealing	with	mtDNA	diseases.		
	
Mitochondrial	DNA	diseases	are	a	group	of	neuromuscular	diseases	that	cause	suffering	and	
premature	death.9 Each	mitochondrion	contains	various	mtDNA	copies.	These	various	copies	
of	 DNA	 are	 not	 uniform:	 there	 exist	 various	mutations	 among	 them,	 some	 of	 which	 are	
deleterious	(i.e.	mutations	that	prevent	the	mitochondrion	from	producing	adequate	levels	
of	energy).	Mutations,	both	deleterious	and	non-deleterious,	can	be	maternally	inherited	or	
created	spontaneously.	In	some	instances,	deleterious	mutant	DNA	can	be	the	only	type	of	
mtDNA	mitochondria	possess.	This	is	referred	to	as	‘homoplasmy’.	Additionally,	deleterious	
mutant	DNA	can	be	present	in	some	mitochondria	in	addition	to	non-deleterious	DNA,	known	
as	‘heteroplasmy’.		
Women	with	homoplasmic	mtDNA	containing	deleterious	mutations	will	always	pass	on	the	
deleterious	mutant	mtDNA	 to	 their	 genetic	 offspring,	 irrespective	 of	whether	 the	 kind	 of	
mutation	will	cause	medical	problems	or	not.	Women	with	heteroplasmic	mtDNA	mutations	
(i.e.	mtDNA	that	possesses	deleterious	and	non-deleterious	mutations),	on	the	other	hand,	
will	pass	on	a	mixture	of	mitochondria	to	their	offspring;	some	of	them	without	deleterious	
mutations	and	some	of	them	with	deleterious	mutations.	In	this	case	the	manifestation	of	the	
disease	will	depend	on	the	deleterious	mtDNA	mutant	load	and	the	kind	of	mutation	that	is	
present.	The	amount	of	deleterious	mutant	mtDNA	within	each	mitochondrion	is	caused	by	
genetic	bottlenecks	during	the	division	of	mitochondria.10		
1.1 Mitochondrial	Replacement	Techniques11		
In	his	two	papers	on	the	subject	of	MRTs12	and	his	response	to	de	Melo-Martin,13	Harris	does	
not	characterise	the	techniques	that	could	be	employed	to	avoid	mtDNA	diseases.14	This	was	
not	necessary	as	he	was	 interested	 in	discussing	the	ethics	of	germline	modifications,	and	
both	 types	 of	 MRT	 can	 cause	 such	 modifications	 when	 selecting	 for	 females.	 De	 Melo-
Martin15	also	does	not	present	a	characterisation	of	these	techniques.	In	fact,	she	mentions	
only	MST	when	discussing	the	safety	issues	related	to	MRTs,	referencing	Masahito	Tachibana	
et	al.’s	research.16		
In	de	Melo-Martin’s	case	the	absence	of	a	proper	characterisation	of	both	MST	and	PNT	is	
relevant	 because	 the	 differences	 between	 them	 yield	 different	 philosophical	 conclusions	
when	 considering	 issues	 about	 harm	 and	 identity,	 as	 Anthony	Wrigley	 et	 al.17	 and	 César	
Palacios-González18	have	examined.	I	return	to	this	point	when	I	discuss	how	mtDNA	diseases	
can	be	‘prevented’	through	MRTs.		
The	two	most	recently	developed	techniques	that	could	help	women	afflicted	with	mtDNA	
diseases	 to	 have	 disease-free,	 genetically-related	 children	 are	 MST	 and	 PNT,	 as	 said	
previously.	Here	I	present	a	summarized	version	of	how	these	techniques	work.	
In	pronuclear	transfer	an	oocyte	from	a	woman	with	an	mtDNA	disease	(Woman	A)	and	an	
oocyte	 from	 a	 donor	 that	 possesses	 healthy	 mitochondria	 (Woman	 B)	 undergo	 IVF.	 The	
oocytes	can	be	fertilized	with	sperm	from	Woman	A’s	partner	or	with	sperm	from	a	donor.	
After	the	sperm	has	fertilized	the	oocytes,	and	during	the	first	hours,	the	nuclear	material	of	
both	progenitors	 is	enclosed	 in	different	membranes	 that	are	 called	 the	male	and	 female	
pronuclei.	On	day	one	in	the	development	phase,	and	prior	to	the	fusion	of	the	pronuclei,	the	
pronuclei	of	both	zygotes	are	removed.	The	pronuclei	housed	in	the	donor’s	egg	are	discarded	
along	 with	 Woman	 A’s	 now	 enucleated	 cell	 (let’s	 remember	 that	 this	 cell	 possesses	
deleteriously	mutated	mtDNA).	The	pronuclei	from	Woman	A,	and	her	partner’s	or	donor’s	
pronuclei,	are	ferried	into	the	now	enucleated	cell	that	was	produced	with	Woman	B’s	oocyte	
(let’s	remember	that	this	cell	possesses	healthy	mitochondria).	The	fused	cell	is	transferred	
into	the	intended	mother,	or	a	surrogate,	and	if	everything	goes	according	to	plan	the	embryo	
will	develop	normally.19		
In	maternal	spindle	transfer,	assisted	reproductive	techniques	are	used	to	obtain	eggs	from	
the	woman	with	an	mtDNA	disease	(Woman	A)	and	from	a	donor	with	healthy	mitochondria	
(Woman	B).	The	nDNA	(which	is	found	on	one	side	of	the	oocyte	in	a	spindle-shaped	group)	
from	both	oocytes	is	removed.	The	chromosomes	of	Woman	A	are	then	ferried	into	Woman	
B’s	enucleated	egg.	Woman	B’s	chromosomes	and	Woman	A’s	enucleated	oocyte	(let’s	again	
remember	 that	 this	 cell	 possesses	 deleteriously	 mutated	 mtDNA)	 are	 discarded.	 The	
reconstructed	egg,	which	has	healthy	mitochondria,	goes	through	IVF	and	then	is	transferred	
into	the	intending	mother,	or	a	surrogate.	The	fused	cell	will	go	on	to	develop	normally,	 if	
everything	goes	as	planned.20		
Two	things	bear	mentioning.	First,	in	both	MST	and	PNT,	it	is	possible	that	mitochondria	with	
deleterious	mutations	could	accidentally	be	transferred	when	the	chromosomal	carry-over	is	
taking	place.	If	this	were	the	case,	it	is	not	impossible	that	the	mtDNA	disease	could	manifest	
in	the	child.	Second,	if	MST	and	PNT	are	successful	then	the	healthy	mitochondria	provided	
by	the	egg	donor	will	be	passed	down	via	the	maternal	line	to	all	subsequent	generations.	
This	 means	 that	 if	 we	 select	 for	 females	 when	 using	 MST	 or	 PNT	 then	 the	 third-party	
mitochondria	will	be	inherited	when	these	women	reproduce.	If,	on	the	other	hand,	we	select	
for	males	then	the	mitochondria	will	not	be	passed	to	the	next	generation.		
	
2.	How	Do	MRTs	Prevent	mtDNA	Diseases?	
	
Harris	states	that	“MRT	will	prevent	serious	mitochondrial	disease	and	the	suffering	it	causes	
for	 women	 with	 mitochondrial	 disease,	 for	 their	 own	 children,	 and	 for	 countless	 future	
generations.”21	I	will	now	explore	how	MRTs	could	do	this.	
While	 Harris	 is	 in	 general	 optimistic	 about	 the	 development	 of	MRTs,	 de	Melo-Martin	 is	
sceptical.	 She	 argues	 against	 him	 that	 the	 resources	 invested	 in	 their	 development	 and	
translation	into	clinical	practice	only	benefits	a	very	small	number	of	people:	
[I]f	 reduction	 of	 the	 burdens	 of	 mitochondrial	 disorders	 were	 indeed	 the	 goal,	
research	on	basic	 and	 clinical	 studies	on	 the	 causes,	 prevention,	 and	 treatment	of	
these	diseases	will	in	all	likelihood	be	more	effective	than	research	on	MRTs.	After	all,	
even	if	all	the	women	who	could	be	eligible	to	use	them	did	so	–a	big	“if”	indeed--,	
these	 technologies	 will	 have	 a	 relatively	 limited	 application.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	
research	 on	 the	 diseases	 themselves	 and	 on	 more	 effective	 treatments	 for	
mitochondrial	disorders	would	be	of	use	to	all	of	those	suffering	from	these	diseases.22		
First,	we	need	to	be	aware	that	MST	and	PNT	prevent	mtDNA	diseases	in	two	different	ways.	
In	most	cases	MST	prevents	mtDNA	diseases	by	creating	someone23	without	the	disease.	MST,	
in	most	cases,	does	not	cure	someone	of	mtDNA	disease.	If	who	comes	into	existence	is	tied	
to	our	nuclear	genetic	makeup	(i.e.	if	our	numerical	identity	depends	on	our	nuclear	genetic	
makeup)	then	MST	cannot	be	said	to	cure	anyone,	in	most	cases,	because	the	fact	that	we	
decide	to	use	MST	alters	the	timing	of	conception	and	thus	alters	which	gametes	will	fuse.	
For	example,	it	is	utterly	improbable	that	the	same	sperm	and	egg	would	have	fused	in	the	
following	scenarios:	(a)	a	couple	decided	to	use	MST,	(b)	the	same	couple	decided	to	naturally	
reproduce,	 instead	of	employing	MST.	Furthermore,	 it	 is	highly	 improbable	 that	 the	same	
sperm	and	egg	would	have	fused	 if	 the	couple	decided	to	use	MST	but	chose	to	have	the	
procedure	one	week	after	MST	took	place	in	scenario	(a).		
I	have	added	the	qualification	 ‘in	most	cases’	because	there	 is	 the	possibility	 that	a	single	
sperm	 and	 a	 single	 egg	 could	 have	 been	 chosen	 beforehand	 for	 the	 procedure.24	 In	 this	
instance	we	could	say	that	MST	cured	someone	because	the	being	that	would	result	from	the	
fertilization	if	MST	did	not	take	place	and	the	being	that	would	result	from	the	fertilization	if	
MST	did	take	place	would	possess	the	same	nuclear	DNA.	This	being	the	case,	we	have	to	
conclude	that	in	most	instances	MST	prevents	mtDNA	diseases	by	creating	someone	without	
a	mtDNA	disease;	and	that	only	when	we	have,	beforehand,	selected	a	single	sperm	and	egg	
can	we	say	that	MST	prevents	mtDNA	disease	by	curing	someone.		
PNT,	on	the	other	hand,	prevents	mtDNA	diseases	by	curing	someone	affected	by	them.	If	we	
accept,	as	before,	that	our	numerical	identity	depends	on	our	nuclear	genetic	makeup,	then	
we	have	to	accept	that	an	embryo	originated	with	X’s	sperm’s	nDNA,	Y’s	egg’s	nDNA,	and	the	
faulty	mtDNA	W	(found	in	Y’s	egg)	is	one	and	the	same	embryo	as	that	originated	with	X’s	
sperm’s	nDNA,	Y’s	egg’s	nDNA,	and	the	healthy	mtDNA	Z	(found	in	the	donor’s	egg).	In	this	
case	we	 can	 affirm	 that	 PNT	 prevents	mtDNA	 diseases	 by	 curing	 someone.	Wrigley	 et	 al.	
reached	this	same	conclusion:		
In	particular,	PNT	is	a	treatment	which	is	attempting	‘pre-emptively’	to	cure	a	person	
without	 affecting	 his	 or	 her	 identity.	 Thus,	 PNT	 is	 like,	 or	 is	 even	 a	 form	 of,	 gene	
therapy.	MST,	on	the	other	hand,	is	a	form	of	selective	reproduction	and	has	more	in	
common	with	pre-implantation	genetic	diagnosis	and	pre-natal	screening	than	it	does	
with	gene	therapy.25		
While	this	is	the	case,26	when	we	consider	carrying	out	PNT	in	an	embryo	that	we	have	already	
produced,	 if	 it	were	not	 for	 the	 fact	 that	PNT	was	going	to	 take	place	most	probably	 that	
embryo	would	not	have	existed:	the	timing	of	conception	would	likely	have	changed	and	thus	
a	different	sperm	and	egg	would	have	fused.		
	
This	clarification	about	how	PNT	and	MST	work	is	important	because	it	tells	us,	specifically,	
how	MRTs	prevent	mtDNA	diseases,	and	because	it	shows	that	de	Melo-Martin	is	mistaken	
when	she	assumes	that	MRTs	would	not	effectively	alleviate	the	burdens	of	mtDNA	diseases.	
When	de	Melo-Martin	speaks	about	the	reduction	of	burdens	of	mitochondrial	disorders	she	
states	 that	other	means	 (such	as	basic	and	clinical	 studies	on	 the	causes,	prevention,	and	
treatment	of	these	diseases)	would	be	“more	effective	than	research	on	MRTs”.27	However,	
if	MRTs	work	as	expected,	 then	PNT	and	MST	with	preselected	gametes	would	 in	 fact	be	
effective	 in	 treating	 mtDNA	 diseases	 if	 effective,	 here,	 means	 effective	 treatment	 of	 a	
condition.	It	is	difficult	to	see	how	techniques	that	will	successfully	treat	conditions	resulting	
from	mtDNA	diseases	can	be	labelled	as	non-effective.				
	
At	this	point	de	Melo-Martin	may	argue	that	she	is	not	talking	about	how	effective	MRTs	are,	
or	 could	 be,	 as	 clinical	 procedures	 but	 how	 cost-effective	 they	 are,	 or	 could	 be,	 when	
compared	 with	 the	 cost-effectiveness	 of	 other	 treatments	 for	 mtDNA	 diseases,	 or	
mitochondrial	diseases	in	general.	If	this	is	so	then	she	is	advancing	an	empirical	claim	that	
needs	to	be	supported	by	empirical	data,	which	she	does	not	provide.	Even	if	this	data	were	
available,	then	de	Melo-Martin	would	still	need	to	present	a	compelling	argument	to	show	
that	 we	 have	 a	 moral	 duty	 to	 allocate	 the	 most	 resources	 to	 the	 most	 cost-effective	
research/treatment.	And	even	if	she	presented	such	an	argument,	we	would	need	to	compare	
all	medical	research/treatments	(assuming	that	this	cost-effectiveness	rationale	is	restricted	
to	medical	practice)	to	find	out	which	would	be	the	most	cost-effective.	This	means	that	it	is	
not	completely	certain	at	this	point	that	research/treatment	on	MRTs	would	be	halted	under	
a	cost-effectiveness	paradigm.		
	
The	problem	with	the	cost-effectiveness	argument	is	that	it	artificially	forces	us	to	compare	
the	cost-effectiveness	of	research	into	MRTs	versus	the	cost-effectiveness	of	other	possible	
treatments	for	mitochondrial	diseases.	To	reach	a	conclusion,	we	need	to	compare	all	possible	
medical	research/treatments	and	then	see	how	research	into	MRTs	fares.	If	this	is	what	de	
Melo-Martin	is	arguing,	then	we	have	to	accept	that	her	case	is	at	best	inconclusive.		
	
3.	Reasons	for	Disclosure	
	
A	central	topic	of	both	Harris’s	and	de	Melo-Martin’s	work	is	whether	MRT-conceived	children	
have	a	right	to	know	their	genetic	origins.	It	is	important	to	note	that	whereas	Harris	states	
that	“[a]	problem	is	often	raised	about	whether	or	not	resulting	children	have	a	right	or	a	
need	to	know	the	identity	of	the	mitochondria	donor	[emphasis	added]”28,	de	Melo-Martin	
focuses	on	“the	alleged	right	to	know	one’s	genetic	origins?	(…)	Furthermore,	I	believe	that	
talk	of	a	right	to	know	one’s	genetic	parentage	imbues	genetic	information	with	very	special	
significance	 and	 thereby	 contributes	 to	 promote	 problematic	 beliefs	 about	 genetic	
essentialism”.29	This	distinction	is	important	because	there	is	a	subtle	difference	between	the	
right	to	know	the	 identity	of	the	mitochondrial	donor	and	the	right	to	know	one’s	genetic	
origins.	The	latter	alleged	right	does	not	seem	to	necessarily	imply	a	right	to	know	the	identity	
of	those	genetic	origins.		
		
Harris	rejects	the	idea	that	there	is	such	a	right,	which	he	labels	as	dangerous	nonsense.	He	
contends	that	if	everybody	had	the	right	to	know	who	their	progenitors	were	we	would	need	
“universal	 paternity	 testing,	with	 all	 the	mischief	 that	 this	would	 entail”.30	He	 anticipates	
“mischief”	because	of	the	phenomenon	known	as	‘non-paternity’.	Non-paternity	is	a	concept	
used	to	describe	cases	in	which	the	biological	father	of	a	child	is	not	who	it	is	presumed	to	be.	
This	belief	can	be	held	by	the	child,	the	presumed	genetic	father	or	the	mother.	According	to	
Harris,	non-paternity	cases	should	not	be	a	cause	for	concern	and	he	even	doubts	the	wisdom	
of	 correcting	 this	 state	 of	 affairs.	 He	 concludes	 that	 “[m]ore	mischief	 and	 anxiety	 would	
certainly	 be	 caused	 by	 recognizing	 a	 right	 to	 know,	 or	 indeed	 a	 duty	 to	 disclose,	 all	
contributors	to	a	given	genome.”31		
De	Melo-Martin	is	also	unpersuaded	by	the	supposed	‘right	to	know’	when	considering	the	
clinical	application	of	MRTs,	but,	as	she	states,	not	for	the	reason	that	Harris	presents:	“my	
disinclination	to	make	much	of	this	alleged	right	to	know	one’s	genetic	origins	has	nothing	to	
do	 with	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 non-paternity,	 but	 simply	 with	 the	 fact	 that	 no	 compelling	
grounds	exist	to	support	this	presumed	right.”32		
Even	if	we	accept,	for	the	sake	of	argument,	that	there	is	no	such	thing	as	a	‘right	to	know’33	
one’s	genetic	origins	or	the	identity	of	the	mitochondrial	donor,	as	de	Melo-Martin	and	Harris	
maintain,	it	must	be	noted	that	there	are	strong	reasons	to	disclose	to	someone	that	she	was	
MRT-conceived.	It	is	important	to	emphasise	that	to	disclose	to	someone	that	she	was	MRT-
conceived	 is	 not	 the	 same	 as	 revealing	 who	 the	 ‘mitochondria	 donor’	 is;	 it	 is	 similar	 to	
disclosing	to	someone	that	she	was	conceived	with	a	donated	gamete	without	revealing	the	
donor’s	identity.	It	is	also	important	to	point	out	that	‘to	disclose	to’	someone	should	not	be	
understood	negatively,	as	in	‘only	if	X	asks	about	the	way	in	which	she	was	conceived	will	we	
tell	her	that	she	was	MRT-conceived’.	Here	disclosure	should	be	understood	in	a	positive	way:	
we	have	to	‘go	and	tell’	X	that	she	was	MRT-conceived.34	
An	Ravelingien	and	Guido	Pennings,	when	discussing	the	issues	around	the	purported	‘right	
to	know’	one’s	genetic	parents	(and	while	referencing	Vardit	Ravitsky’s35	work	on	the	topic),	
touch	upon	some	of	the	reasons	we	have	for	disclosing	to	someone	her	genetic	background:	
	
Awareness	 of	 one’s	 genetic	 background	 is	 deemed	 necessary	 for	 a	 better	
understanding	of	and	decision	making	about	one’s	health	 risks	 (…)	Access	 to	a	 full	
picture	of	one’s	genetic	background	 is	also	 regarded	as	essential	 in	 terms	of	one’s	
psychological	well-being	and	family	relationships.36		
At	this	point,	let’s	set	aside	issues	around	how	knowing	that	one	was	MRT-conceived	affects	
one’s	psychological	well-being	and	family	relationships.37	Instead,	I	will	unpack	the	reasons	
parents	have	to	disclose	to	their	children	that	they	were	MRT-conceived.	If	parents	disclose	
the	conditions	of	their	conception,	these	children,	when	they	come	to	age,	will	have	a	better	
understanding	 of	 the	 health	 risks	 associated	 with	 their	 conception,	 or	 in	 this	 case	 the	
uncertainties	about	such	health	risks.		
	
Knowing	one’s	genetic	background	can	be	instrumentally	good:	it	provides	information	about	
oneself	that	might	otherwise	be	nonobvious,	and	this	information	can	be	helpful	for	better	
assessing	and	managing	health	risks.	Knowing	that	both	my	parents	are	recessive	carriers	of	
a	Mendelian-inherited-type	genetic	condition	provides	me	with	information	with	which	I	can	
make	better	informed	decisions	regarding	my	lifestyle	choices,	decisions	that	could	benefit	
my	health	in	the	long	term,	for	example	refraining	from	smoking.	While	whether	I	have	a	right	
to	 such	 information	 is	 outside	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 paper,	 it	 is	 true	 that	 possessing	 such	
information	 is	 instrumentally	 good	 for	me	 and	 that	my	 parents	 have	 at	 least	pro	 tanto38	
reasons	to	reveal	it.	This	being	the	case,	I	can	also	affirm	that	possessing	the	information	that	
I	was	MRT-conceived	can	be	instrumentally	good	for	me,	and	thus	that	my	parents	also	have	
pro	tanto	reasons	to	reveal	it.	Furthermore,	these	reasons	are	stronger	because	the	way	in	
which	I	was	conceived	is	novel	and	thus	could	carry	more	health	risks.	It	must	be	noted	at	this	
point	that	the	advent	and	increasing	popularity	of	personal	genomic	services	(for	example,	
23andMe)	could	make	it	possible	for	someone	to	come	to	know	that	she	was	MRT-conceived	
without	her	parents	having	to	disclose	this	to	her.		
	
An	individual	who	knew	about	her	MRT-conception	could	use	this	information	to	take	better	
care	 of	 her	 health,	 and	 to	 enable	 her	 medical	 team	 to	 make	 better	 decisions	 when	
investigating	the	causes	of	an	illness,	for	example.	As	John	Appleby	says:	
	
Disclosure	is	important	for	at	least	two	reasons:	(1)	the	MRT-conceived	person’s	own	
medical	welfare;	and	(2)	knowledge	of	having	been	MRT-conceived	enables	persons	
to	report	any	medical	problems	back	to	clinicians	and	researchers	for	the	sake	of	the	
wellbeing	of	future	generations	who	might	be	conceived	via	MRTs.39		
He	further	provides	an	additional	reason	for	disclosure:	“it	would	save	some	children	from	
the	stress	and	anxiety	of	worrying	about	suffering	from	the	same	mtDNA	disorders	as	their	
mothers.40		
	
Harris	 and	 de	 Melo-Martin	 would	 agree,	 as	 would	 any	 other	 reasonable	 person,	 that	
regardless	 of	 the	 existence	of	 a	 right	 to	 know	one’s	 genetic	 origins	or	 the	 identity	 of	 the	
mitochondrial	donor	there	are	strong	pro	tanto	reasons	for	disclosing	to	someone	that	she	
was	MRT-conceived.	At	 this	point	we	have	 to	 conclude	 that,	while	 their	discussion	of	 the	
supposed	‘right	to	know’	is	important	and	regardless	of	whether	they	are	correct	or	not,	we	
need	 to	 go	 beyond	 it	 and	 take	 into	 consideration	 other	 reasons	 for	 disclosure,	 as	 just	
presented.				
	
Conclusion		
De	Melo-Martin	and	Harris	have	had	a	lively	debate	(which	fits	within	the	broader	scope	of	
recent	work	on	the	ethics	of	MRTs	which	deals	with	 issues	of	 identity,41	transgenerational	
health	 risks,42	 the	 disclosure	 of	MRT	 conception,43	 genealogical	 ancestry,44	 first	 in-human	
use,45	 the	 possible	 use	 of	 nonhuman	 oocytes	 for	 PNT,46	 and	 the	 anonymity	 status	 of	 the	
‘mitochondrial	donor’47)	regarding	the	morality	of	MRT	research	and	clinical	practice.	In	this	
paper	 I	have	broadened	the	scope	of	 the	discussion	regarding	mitochondrial	diseases	and	
MRTs.	I	showed	that	de	Melo-Martin’s	cost-effectiveness	argument	is	at	best	inconclusive.48	
I	also	showed	that	it	is	methodologically	important	to	differentiate	between	mitochondrial	
diseases	in	order	to	understand	which	diseases	MRTs	could	prevent,	and	how	MRTs	would	do	
this.		
Furthermore,	I		showed	that	using	MST	without	preselected	gametes	prevents	mtDNA	disease	
by	creating	people	without	an	mtDNA	disease,	rather	than	curing	those	who	already	have	an	
mtDNA	disease.	PNT	and	MST	with	preselected	gametes,	on	the	other	hand,	can	be	said	to	
cure	mtDNA	disease	insofar	as	the	numerical	identity	of	the	individual	who	will	be	‘brought’	
into	existence	is	not	altered.	This	is	relevant	in	relation	to	de	Melo-Martin’s	claim	that	other	
research	avenues	might	be	more	“effective”	in	treating	mtDNA	diseases,	despite	the	fact	that	
if	PNT	and	MST	with	preselected	gametes	were	successful	they	would	for	certain	be	effective	
in	treating	mtDNA	diseases.		
Finally,	 I	 have	 shown	 that	 parents	 have	 strong	 pro	 tanto	 reasons	 for	 disclosing	 to	 their	
children	 that	 they	were	MRT-conceived.	 If	 they	do	 so,	 their	 children	will	be	able	 to	make	
better	decisions	regarding	their	medical	welfare	(this	issue	is	heightened	by	the	fact	that	at	
least	 the	 first	generation	of	MRT-conceived	children	would	be	born	 from	an	experimental	
technique),	and	medical	teams	will	be	better	equipped	to	treat	them.	This	shows	that	even	if	
there	is	no	such	thing	as	a	‘right	to	know’,	as	Harris	and	de	Melo-Martin	maintain,	there	are	
important	reasons	to	reveal	to	someone	that	she	was	MRT-conceived.		
The	richer	account	of	MRTs	that	I	have	presented	here	show	us	that	there	is	much	more	to	
be	said	about	the	morality	of	MRTs	research	and	its	clinical	practice.	
1	Harris	J.	Germline	manipulation	and	our	future	worlds.	The	American	Journal	of	Bioethics:	
AJOB.	2015;15(12):30–4;	Harris	J.	Germline	Modification	and	the	Burden	of	Human	Existence.	
Cambridge	Quarterly	of	Healthcare	Ethics.	2016a;25(1):6–18.			
2	de	Melo-Martin	I.	When	the	milk	of	human	kindness	becomes	a	luxury	(and	untested)	good.	
A	 reply	 to	 Harris’	 unconditional	 embrace	 of	 mitochondrial	 replacement	 techniques.	
Cambridge	Quarterly	of	Healthcare	Ethics.	2016	(Forthcoming).	
3	 Harris	 J.	 How	 to	welcome	 new	 technologies:	 some	 comments	 on	 Inmaculada	 de	Melo-
Martin.	Cambridge	Quarterly	of	Healthcare	Ethics.	2016b	(Forthcoming).	
4	The	advent	of	in	vitro	gametogenesis	could	change	this	fact,	given	that	one	day	it	might	be	
possible	to	generate	eggs	from	male	iPS	cells	and	ES	cells.	See:	Palacios-González	C,	Harris	J,	
Testa	G.	Multiplex	parenting:	 IVG	and	the	generations	 to	come.	 Journal	of	Medical	Ethics.	
2014;40(11):752–8.	
5	 Zeviani	M,	 Bonilla	 E,	 DeVivo	 DC,	 DiMauro	 S.	Mitochondrial	 diseases.	Neurologic	 Clinics.	
1989;7(1):123–56.	
6	 Taylor	RW,	 Taylor	GA,	Durham	SE,	 Turnbull	DM.	 The	determination	of	 complete	human	
mitochondrial	 DNA	 sequences	 in	 single	 cells:	 implications	 for	 the	 study	 of	 somatic	
mitochondrial	DNA	point	mutations.	Nucleic	Acids	Research.	2001;29(15):e74–e74.	
7	See	note	1,	Harris	2015;15(12):31;	Harris	2016a;25(1):10.	
8	Nuffield	Council	on	Bioethics.	Novel	Techniques	 for	 the	Prevention	of	Mitochondrial	DNA	
Disorders:	An	Ethical	Review.	London:	Nuffield	Council	on	Bioethics;	2012:vii.	
9	 Department	 of	 Health.	Mitochondrial	 Donation	 A	 Consultation	 on	 Draft	 Regulations	 to	
Permit	 the	 Use	 of	 New	 Treatment	 Techniques	 to	 Prevent	 the	 Transmission	 of	 a	 Serious	
Mitochondrial	 Disease	 from	 Mother	 to	 Child.	 2014;	 available	 at	
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/serious-mitochondrial-disease-new-
techniques-to-prevent-transmission	(last	accessed	25	Mar	2016)	
																																																						
																																																																																																																																																																								
10	Appleby	JB.	The	ethical	challenges	of	the	clinical	introduction	of	mitochondrial	replacement	
techniques.	Medicine	Health	Care	Philosophy.	2015;18(4):501–14;	and	see	note	8,	Nuffield	
Council	on	Bioethics	2014.	
11	 It	 is	 worth	 mentioning	 that	 when	 referring	 to	 both	 Maternal	 Spindle	 Transfer	 and	
Pronuclear	 Transfer,	 Harris	 uses	 the	 term	 ‘Mitochondrial	 Replacement	 Therapy’	 while	 de	
Melo-Martin	and	I	use	the	term	‘Mitochondrial	Replacement	Techniques’.			
12	See	note	1,	Harris	2015;15(12):	30–4;	Harris	2016a;25(1):6-18.	
13	See	note	3,	Harris	2016b	(Forthcoming).	
14	 There	 is	 another	 technique,	which	 I	will	 not	 discuss	 here,	 that	 has	 been	 suggested	 for	
preventing	the	clinical	expression	of	mtDNA	diseases:	ooplasmic	transfer.	It	involves	injecting	
cytoplasm	from	a	donor’s	oocyte,	with	healthy	mitochondria,	into	an	oocyte	with	diseased	
mitochondria.	 See	 Brenner	 CA,	 Barritt	 JA,	 Willadsen	 S,	 Cohen	 J.	 Mitochondrial	 DNA	
heteroplasmy	after	human	ooplasmic	transplantation.	Fertility	and	Sterility.	2000;74(3):573–
8.		
15	See	note	2,	de	Melo-Martin	2016	(Forthcoming).	
16	 Tachibana	M,	 Amato	 P,	 Sparman	M,	Woodward	 J,	 Sanchis	 DM,	 Ma	 H,	 et	 al.	 Towards	
germline	gene	therapy	of	inherited	mitochondrial	diseases.	Nature.	2013;493(7434):627–31.	
17	 Wrigley	 A,	 Wilkinson	 S,	 Appleby	 JB.	 Mitochondrial	 replacement:	 ethics	 and	 identity.	
Bioethics.	2015;29(9):631–8.	
18	 I	have	discussed	this	 in	my	as	yet	unpublished	papers:	 ‘Ethical	Aspects	of	Mitochondrial	
Replacement	 Techniques:	 Responding	 to	 the	 Objections’	 and	 ‘Ethics	 of	 Mitochondrial	
Replacement	Techniques:	A	Habermasian	Perspective’.	
19	Craven	L,	Tuppen	HA,	Greggains	GD,	Harbottle	SJ,	Murphy	JL,	Cree	LM,	et	al.	Pronuclear	
transfer	in	human	embryos	to	prevent	transmission	of	mitochondrial	DNA	disease.	Nature.	
2010;465(7294):82–5.	
20	See	note	16,	Tachibana	2013;493(7434):627–31.	
21	See	note	1,	Harris	2015;15(12):32;	Harris	2016a;25(1):11.	
22	See	note	2,	de	Melo-Martin	2016	(Forthcoming).	
23	I	am	not	unaware	of	the	philosophical	problems	surrounding	early	embryo	individuation	
(i.e.	fission	and	fusion	cases).	Thus,	when	I	talk	about	‘curing	someone’	I	am	not	assuming	
that	the	embryo	is	a	person,	or	that	it	cannot	divide	itself	into	two	or	more	identical	copies,	
or	 that	 these	 identical	 copies	 cannot	 fuse	 back	 together.	 Here	 ‘someone’	 should	 be	
understood	as	a	shorthand	for	‘an	embryo	that	can	give	rise	to	a	body,	or	bodies,	that	can	
have,	or	not	have,	an	mtDNA	disease’.				
24	I	have	explored	this	at	length	elsewhere,	see	note	18.	
25	See	note	17,	Wrigley,	Wilkinson	,	Appleby		2015;29(9):638.	
26	Even	when	Wrigley	et	al.	recognised	the	differences	between	PNT	and	MST	they	failed	to	
realise	that	MST	with	preselected	gametes	would	also	cure	someone,	as	just	explained.				
27	See	note	2,	de	Melo-Martin	2016	(Forthcoming).	
28	See	note	1,	Harris	2016a;25(1):12.	
29	See	note	2,	de	Melo-Martin	2016	(Forthcoming).	
30	See	note	1,	Harris	2016a;25(1):12.	
31	See	note	1,	Harris	2016a;25(1):12.	
32	See	note	2,	de	Melo-Martin	2016	(Forthcoming).	
33	For	a	recent	informative	discussion	about	the	‘right	to	know’	see:	Ravelingien	A,	Pennings	
G.	The	right	to	know	your	genetic	parents:	from	open-identity	gamete	donation	to	routine	
paternity	testing.	The	American	Journal	of	Bioethics:	AJOB.	2013;13(5):33–41;	Brandt	R.	Why	
																																																																																																																																																																								
disclosure	of	genetic	ancestry	in	misattributed	paternity	cases	should	be	treated	differently	
from	disclosure	in	adoption	and	gamete	donation.	The	American	Journal	of	Bioethics:	AJOB.	
2013;13(5):58–60.		
34	How	and	when	to	disclose	are	questions	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper.	
35	Ravitsky	V.	Conceived	and	deceived:	the	medical	interests	of	donor-conceived	individuals.	
Hastings	Centre	Report.	2012;42(1):17–22.	
36	See	note	33,	Ravelingien,	Pennings	2013;13(5):33.	
37	 For	 a	 discussion	 of	 this	 issue	 see	 Institute	 of	 Medicine	 of	 the	 National	 Academies.	
Mitochondrial	 Replacement	 Techniques:	 Ethical,	 Social,	 and	 Policy	 Considerations	
[Prepublication	Copy:	Uncorrected	Proofs].	The	National	Academies	Press	2016;	available	at	
http://www.nap.edu/21871	 (last	 accessed	 3	Mar	 2016);	 and	 note	 	 See	 note	 10,	 Appleby	
2015;18(4):501–14	
38	“A	pro	tanto	reason	to	φ	is	a	reason	that	genuinely	speaks	in	favour	of	φ-ing,	but,	while	a	
pro	tanto	reason	to	φ	favours	φ-ing,	it	may	not	do	so	decisively:	the	overall	balance	of	reasons	
may	direct	one	to	do	otherwise”.	Lenman	J.	Reasons	for	Action:	Justification	vs.	Explanation.	
In:	 Zalta	 EN,	 editor.	 The	 Stanford	 Encyclopedia	 of	 Philosophy.	 Winter	 2011;	 available	 at	
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/reasons-just-vs-expl/	 (last	 accessed	 4	
Mar	2016).	
39	See	note	10,	Appleby	2015;18(4):507.	
40	See	note	10,	Appleby	2015;18(4):507.	
41	 See	 note	 8,	 Nuffield	 Council	 on	 Bioethics	 2014;	 note	 17,	 Wrigley,	 Wilkinson,	 Appleby	
2015;29(9):631–8;	 note	 37,	 Institute	 of	 Medicine	 of	 the	 National	 Academies	 2016;	
Bredenoord	AL,	Dondorp	W,	Pennings	G,	De	Wert	G.	Ethics	of	modifying	the	mitochondrial	
genome.	Journal	of	Medical	Ethics.	2011;37(2):97–100;	and	Baylis	F.	The	ethics	of	creating	
children	with	three	genetic	parents.	Reproductive	BioMedicine	Online.	2013;26(6):531–4.	
42	See	note	8,	Nuffield	Council	on	Bioethics	2014;	note	10,	Appleby	2015;18(4):501–14;	note	
37,	Institute	of	Medicine	of	the	National	Academies	2016;	and	note	41,	Baylis	2013;26(6):531–
4;	 Johnson	 MH.	 Tri-parenthood	 –	 a	 simply	 misleading	 term	 or	 an	 ethically	 misguided	
approach?	Reproductive	BioMedicine	Online.	2013;26(6):516–9;	and	Bredenoord	AL,	Dondorp	
W,	Pennings	G,	De	Wert	G.	Avoiding	transgenerational	risks	of	mitochondrial	DNA	disorders:	
a	morally	acceptable	reason	for	sex	selection?	Human	Reproduction.	2010;25(6):1354–60.	
43	See	note	8,	Nuffield	Council	on	Bioethics	2014;	note	10,	Appleby	2015;18(4):501–14;	and	
note	37,	Institute	of	Medicine	of	the	National	Academies	2016.	
44	See	note	41,	Baylis	2013;26(6):531–4;	and	note	37,	Institute	of	Medicine	of	the	National	
Academies	2016.	
45	 See	 note	 8,	 Nuffield	 Council	 on	 Bioethics	 2014;	 note	 37,	 Institute	 of	 Medicine	 of	 the	
National	 Academies	 2016;	 and	 Bredenoord	 AL,	 Braude	 P.	 Ethics	 of	 mitochondrial	 gene	
replacement:	from	bench	to	bedside.	British	Medical	Journal.	2010	Nov	8;341:c6021.	
46	Baylis	F.	“Babies	with	some	animal	DNA	in	them”:	a	woman’s	choice?	International	Journal	
of	Feminist	Approaches	to	Bioethics.	2009;2(2):75–96.	
47	 Appleby	 JB.	 Should	 mitochondrial	 donation	 be	 anonymous?	 Journal	 of	 Medicine	 and	
Philosophy.	2016	(Forthcoming).	
48	After	this	paper	was	accepted	for	publication,	Tina	Rulli’s	paper	“What	Is	the	Value	of	Three-
Parent	 IVF?”	 appeared	on	press.	 I	 contend	 that	 the	argument	 that	 I	 have	presented	here	
against	de	Melo-Martin’s	cost-effectiveness	argument	could	equally	be	applied	to	Rulli’s	cost-
effectiveness	argument,	but	I	will	have	to	leave	a	thorough	examination	of	her	argument	for	
																																																																																																																																																																								
a	future	paper.	See:	Tina	Rulli.	What	Is	the	Value	of	Three-Parent	IVF?.	Hastings	Center	Report.	
2016;46:1-10.	DOI:	10.1002/hast.594	
	
